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Preface
In this study of Algerian migration to France, Dr. Adler describes
the many facets of that movement and its variable effects upon relations
between the two countries. Placing the movement of labor in a broader
historical context, the author traces Algerian emigration from 1870 to
1962 and identifies the attempts of each government to manipulate the flows
to national advantage.
Dr. Adler presents a fairly comprehensive description of the various
accords governing labor migration and their interconnection with the dominant
foreign policy concerns of France and Algeria. He indicates how migration
trends were influenced by political considerations and how each government
sought to control the flow of labor. A persuasive picture of the politici-
zation of migration is sketched out, and the reader obtains a good view of
migration as an instrument of foreign policy.
In choosing to focus on Algerian migration to France, Dr. Adler has
had to bypass the new migration to Algeria: concomitant with the movement
of Algerians to France, and with the development of a special relationship
between the two countries, there developed an emerging flow of Egyptians,
Lebanese, Jordanians, and even Palestinians into Algeria. These flows
represent the other side of the migration stream connecting Algeria to
neighboring states. That the flows to France were, and continue to be, most
pervasive should in no way obscure the emergence of new flows into Algeria.
Increase in petroleum revenues has created incentives for Arab migration to
Algeria and provides yet another set of constraints on a government anxious
-ii-
to develop viable means of regulating the flow of labor across national
borders.
Dr. Adler properly terms the issue of Algerian migration as "sensitive".
Perhaps equally sensitive is the increasing movement into Algeria and the
new interdependence that may emerge between Algeria and the neighboring
Arab states. Dr. Adler's study is an important survey of the dominant flows
from Algeria. The new flows may generate added pressure upon relations with
France and disrupt the recent equilibrium in relations between the two
countries.
Nazli Choucri
Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
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MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
THE CASE OF FRANCE AND ALGERIA
1. Introduction
At a conservative estimate, there are about 13 million foreign workers
currently resident in the countries of western Europe. This huge reservoir
of manpower has been of vital importance to the European market-economies
in sustaining rapid rates of economic growth during the 1960's and early
1970's. At the same time these foreign workers have represented a critical,
although sometimes underutilized, national resource for their countries of
origin. By the huge amounts of money they have transferred home and by
their frequent return visits (to name only two of the more obvious factors),
these workers represent a vast human transmission-belt of contact between
developed and developing countries.
The international character of worker migration is at once obvious and
obscure. These are foreign workers ("gastarbeiter" or guest workers in the
euphemistic German) and their existence is often one of the most important
aspects of countries' bilateral relations. Nevertheless it is often very
hard to understand in precisely what way the "strand" of migration fits into
the "web" of international relations. Is international migration to be
considered an aspect apart of international politics, governed by its own
rules and laws? Or, in contrast, is it possible to fit migration into a
broader overall pattern? What part, in short, does migration play in the
relations between sending and receiving countries? Is it likely to be a
source of friction and conflict, or does it promote cooperation?
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How do governments set about controlling migration when their actions
clearly affect the economic, political and social circumstances of foreign
governments and peoples? Are the politics of migration related to the
politics of other commercial relations between countries, and if so how?
This monograph will attempt to answer some of these questions in the
case of France and Algeria. After an examination of the history and evolution
of Algerian emigration in the colonial period, we shall discuss the negotia-
tions and agreements entered into by France and Algeria which regulate
migratory flows. This will provide the basis for the discussion which follows
of the broader aspects of the countries' relations and the part played in them
by migration.
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2. From Band-Aid to Crutch: Algerian Emigration 1870-1962
2.1 Migration Before World War I
Since the 19th century, France has been an importer of foreign labor.
Despite a hundred years of development, two World Wars, and the ending of the
colonial system, some elements of the pattern have remained stable. For
example, in 1886, there were more than 1,100,000 foreigners in France. Most
of these were Belgian (more than 43 percent), followed by Italians (about
23 percent), Germans (9 percent), and Spanish and Swiss (7 percent each).
Three quarters of them worked in industry, the rest in agriculture. In the
19th century the foreign workers were both culturally, ethnically and geogra-
phically fairly close to the French, and by no means had a monopoly on
unskilled or badly paid jobs. 1
It was not until the start of the 20th century that France had recourse
to workers from Algeria, and not until the First World War that this immigra-
tion achieved significant proportions. By 1905 there were a few hundred
industrial workers from Algeria concentrated almost exclusively in the
Marseilles region, as well as a certain number of itinerant peddlars frequenting
the resort towns. By 1912 there were between 4,000-5,000 Algerians in France,
and by 1914 this number approached 30,000.2
The background to this increasing migration of Algerians is to be found
mainly in the country's growing impoverishment, in turn largely a consequence
of France's colonial policy. In particular, numerous authorities cite the
significance of the expropriation by the colons of communal lands, and lands
belonging to tribal clans.3 The frequent insurrections against French rule,
such as the one in Kabylia in 1871, were the occasion for fierce military
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repression as well as reprisals involving the destruction of villages and
crops4 and the confiscation of lands.5 The departure of Algerians from
Algeria was, however, kept severely in check almost until the outbreak of
the First World War by a decree of the Governor General of Algeria in 1876
which required a travel permit for those wishing to leave. The formalities
attached to the obtaining of this document were so strict that it was an
effective check on emigration.6 This requirement was suppressed in 1913 and
1914 as the needs of Metropolitan France on the eve of the outbreak of the
War became ascendant. But the tension between the interests of the colons
themselves, who tended to oppose the departure to France of their labor
supply, and the interests of the Metropole which generally favored the easing
of labor shortages by recourse to Algerians, was never completely resolved
in the colonial period.
During the war Algerian labor was recruited directly by the French
government, especially the Ministry of War, to work in munitions factories and
elsewhere. Between 1914 and 1918 North Africa supplied France with 175,000
soldiers and 150,000 workers, of whom the great majority were Algerians. 7
2.2 Migration During the Inter-War Period
Immediately after the end of the First World War, most of the Algerians
were repatriated while the country struggled both to revive its war-
suffocated economy and re-integrate its demobilized army into the labor
force. By 1919 only a few thousand Algerians remained in France. However
the boom of the twenties soon resulted in a new and considerable influx (see
Figure 2a). Simultaneously, the colons of Algeria, fearing that the exodus
would result in a shortage of labor in Algeria, started to take restrictive
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measures, including, in 1924, the requirement for the prospective emigrant
to obtain a work contract, a medical certificate, and an identity card. 8
This led to a reduction in departures from Algeria, followed by an increase
in clandestine emigration. In 1926, as a result of an appeal by French
interests concerned to increase the flow of Algerian migration, the Conseil
d'Etat annulled the 1924 restrictions on the grounds that the Governor-
9General of Algeria had exceeded his powers. The 1924 decrees were replaced
in 1928 by rather more stringent restrictions requiring those who wished to
emigrate to obtain an identity card, proof of not having committed serious
violations of the law, medical certificate, and a "caution" of 150 francs,
to pay, if necessary, for a return ticket.
During the Depression of 1929 and 1930, return migration increased sharply
and between 1931 and 1935 the number of arrivals in France remained quite
low. The official figures for North African labor in France fell from 65,000
in 1932 to 32,000 by 1936.10
The economic upturn after 1936 was accompanied by demands in Algeria
from Moslem representatives for an easing of restrictions on emigration. On
July 17, 1936, the regulations were changed to permit freedom of circulation
between France and Algeria with the necessity only of obtaining an identity
card. Once again, emigration to France increased, only to slow down again
after 1938 with the introduction of health controls and a simultaneous slow-
down in the French economy.
During most of the period 1919 to 1940 there was a great degree of
parallelism between the movements of Algerians to France and the movements
of workers from other countries. In fact, immigration to France between the
wars followed very closely the movement of the French economy, rising during
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the booms and trailing off during slumps.12 Table 2a shows the evolution
of the Algerian population in France compared with the evolution of the
"other" foreign population. It can be seen from this table that the Algerian
population of France, while following the same trends as the rest of the
foreign population, was more volatile in its movements. Whereas the number
of foreigners doubled between 1921 and the peak year of 1930, the number of
Algerians rose by a factor of 3.5, that is, from 35,000 to 120,000. During
the Depression, the total number of foreigners declined only slightly from
3,000,000 to 2,798,000, while the Algerians fell in total by 1936 to almost
a quarter of their 1930 figure.
This difference can be attributed to the fact that Algerians were
subject to French government regulation not only in their place of arrival
(i.e., France), but also in their place of departure. The colonial government
on the whole desired the restriction of Algerian emigration and tended to be
successful in this policy when the economic situation in France favored the
reduction of immigration in general. Additionally, it is probably true that
Algerians were employed disproportionately in those parts of the French
economy most affected by cyclical fluctuations such as construction and farm
labor. (Granotier makes the related observation that the tendency for
migrant labor to concentrate in the worst paid and least attractive jobs is
a major distinguishing feature of the migration of the thirties compared to
that of the 19th century.) 13
2.3 Migration After the Second World War
During the Second World War the emigration of Algerians at first
declined, increased to some extent after the occupation of France when the
Table 2a
Evolution of the Algerian Population in France Compared
Population, 1919-1936
to French, Foreign and Algerian
(thousands and percent) Algerians in France:
Population
Moslem
population
Foreign
population Algerians
Foreigners
as % of
Algerians
as % of
Alg. in Alg. in
Fr. as % Fr. as %
of Algerian of French
of France of Algeria in France in France French pop. foreign pop. population population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3/1) (4/3) (4/2) (4/1)
37,000
37,500
38,060**
38,200
38,500
4,923
5,191
5 ,499***
5,588
6,201
1,417
1,532
2,400
3,000
2,715
2,798
5
35
50*
120
85
32
3.7%
4.1%
6.4%
7.9%
7.1%
7.3%
0.35%
2.3%
2.1%
4.0%
3.1%
1.1%
0.7%
0.1%
2.2%
1.5%
0.5%
0.09%
0.13% 00
0.32%
0.22%
0.08%
* Estimate based on entries and exits 1919-1926.
** Estimate based on 1.6% annual population growth
*** Estimate based on population growth 1926-1931.
1926-1931.
Source: Rager, .. cit., pp. 2-4; Granotier, og. ci t., p. 44; Augarde, o2. cit., p. 14 and p. 38; and
Negadi, G. et al. "La Situation Demographique en Alg6rie, " La Demographie Algerienne, Dossiers
Documentaires, No. 19-20, Ministere de l'Information Algiers, Dec. 1972, pp. 13-14.
1919
1921
1926
1930
1931
1936
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Germans themselves organized Algerian immigration, and was then suspended
altogether in 1942.
After the liberation of France, one of the main preoccupations of the
French government was the supply of labor which would be needed for economic
reconstruction. In 1945 the Office National de l'Immigration (ONI) was set
up. Its task was both to organize the immigration of sufficient workers for
French industry and to boost France's stagnating population growth. 14 As a
French colony Algeria, however, escaped the jurisdiction of the ONI, and
despite attempts to regulate Algerian emigration the more or less unhindered
passage of Algerians to France was institutionalized. In 1947 the new
"Organic Law" which redefined Algeria's status as a French colony was
promulgated. This included the provision that all Algerians, Moslems and
French, were henceforth to be considered French citizens. Discrimination
against Moslems (for example by disallowing them freedom to work in France)
was outlawed. The colonial administration made various attempts to regulate
the outflow, such as instituting work contracts for emigrants, but Rager
points out that of sixty-five thousand emigrants in 1947 only one thousand
had contracts, and by 1949 of eighty-three thousand who left in search of
work, only three hundred were in fact furnished with a contract.15
Figure 2b shows the evolution of Algerian emigration in the years
before Algerian independence and compares it with immigration from other
countries. ONI immigration follows very closely the pattern of the economic
situation in France, with the post-war boom followed by the slow-down of the
early fifties. A rapid increase in ONI immigration in 1956-57 marked an
economic revival, and was followed in 1958-59 by a downturn resulting from
the financial and political crisis of those years. The resurgence of 1960
which lasted until 1964 saw a revival of immigration.
Figure 2b: Permanent Workers Introduced by the French ONI and Arrivals from Algeria, 1945-1961
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What is extraordinary in the case of Algeria is the fact that between
1947 and 1957 the migration pattern is almost completely contrary to ONI-
controlled immigration. This is in contrast to the inter-war period, when
the various attempts at regulating emigration from Algeria only resulted in
its following quite closely the curve of economic activity. Paradoxically,
in a period when there was legal freedom of circulation Algerian emigration
seemed to be behaving perversely.
The conclusion would seem to be suggested that emigration during this
period was responding not so much to "pull" factors in France, but to "push"
factors in Algeria.16 First, one must note the growing importance of the
demographic impulse. The rate of population growth averaged 1.6 percent
annually from 1936 to 1948 and was increasing, averaging 2.7 percent in the
period 1948-1954. In absolute terms the population of Algerian Moslems grew
by 12 million between 1936 and 1948, and by 1.3 million between 1948 and
1954, from 6,300,000 to 7,460,000 to 8,745,000.17
Second, the growing political unrest in Algeria led the colonial
authorities towards the view that emigration could be a safety-valve for
releasing pent-up nationalist pressure; and emigration, far from being
discouraged, was encouraged. The rapid population growth meant that fears
of a labor shortage in Algeria were even less firmly based in reality than
during the 1920's and 1930's. 18
After the start of the Algerian Revolution in November 1954, emigration
declined dramatically. The number of departures fell from nearly 200,000 in
1955 to just over 40,000 in 1958. This fall can almost certainly be attri-
buted to the start of the war, and the increasing emphasis given to the
question of safety and public order. In 1956 an Office Algerien de la Main-
d'Oeuvre (O.F.A.M.O.) was created and given a monopoly of recruitment. To
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some extent this resulted in a diminution of emigration, but the O.F.A.M.O.'s
powers were limited and monopoly of recruitment was more theoretical than
actual. French policy on emigration at this time was torn by several
competing priorities and the consequence was a policy lacking in coherence
or reason. The start of the war gave the Ministry of the Interior, whose
concern was with policing, law and order, a strong hand in attempting to
restrict migration to the Metropole. The view tended to be that political
activities were easier to suppress in Algeria than in France. There was,
however, a contrary view which argued that the "safety-valve" approach could
result in less support for the nationalists in Algeria by dividing the move-
ment and easing economic hardship. This latter view was probably more
characteristic of the Ministries of Labor and Social Security, and Public
Health and Population, who were on the whole anxious for immigration from
Algeria to continue, but wished to see it regulated and controlled. 19
Meanwhile the O.F.A.M.O. escaped the jurisdiction of the French Ministry of
Labor and was more susceptible to the political priorities of the colonial
regime. The result of this confusion was a policy which bore little relation
either to the needs of labor-supply in France or to the exigencies of counter-
revolution in Algeria. In the final year of Algeria's struggle for indepen-
dence, 1961-62, emigration was once again on the increase, the number of
departures almost matching those of the early fifties. Economic necessities
in France coincided with the years of greatest terror in Algeria, provoking
a large outflow after 1958.
Tables 2b to 2e illustrate the evolution in qualitative terms of the
Algerian emigration to France after World War II and before Algerian indepen-
dence. As far as type of employment is concerned the rajor trend shown by
Table 2b is the growing concentration of Algerians in building and public
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works (from 17 to 37 percent, 1949-1960), and in electrical and mechanical
engineering. Mining and metal industries declined to a great extent and
chemical industries to some extent, while agriculture and textiles remained
fairly constant.
Table 2c shows the changes in terms of level of skill, the evolution
being toward a decline in laborers but an increase in the proportion of semi-
skilled. This shift, which does not mark a very great change in level of
skill, is probably accounted for by the decline in the importance of mining
activities and the growing concentration of Algerians in factory work. There
was, however, a distinct shift in the percentages of skilled workers, from
four percent in 1952 to eight percent by 1962. Office workers and supervisory
grades remained negligible.
More remarkable, perhaps, was the evolution toward migration of families
in place of the celibatory migration of earlier years. In 1954 only 4 percent
of the net immigration of Algerians consisted of women and children (Table 2d).
By 1957 this had jumped to nearly 17 percent, and in the last year of the War
of Independence close to half of the net immigration (45 percent) consisted
of women and children. This trend indicates in part a growing movement
towards permanent or long-term emigration, and in part the desire of many
Algerians to escape the horrors of the war in their own country. Indeed,
after the independence of Algeria had been achieved the proportion of women
and children among emigrants fell, although not nearly to the level of 1954.
In 1954 Algerians were the fourth largest group of foreign workers in
France, after Italians, Spanish and Polish workers. At that date they repre-
sented just under 12 percent of the total foreign population. By 1962
Algerians were the second largest group, just over 16 percent of the foreign
-14-
Table 2b
Distribution of Algerian Workers in France by Branch of Activity
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Table 2d
Evolution of Family Emigration From Algeria to France
1954-1961
Net
Migration
Men
Net
Migration
Women and
Children
Total
(1+2)
Percent
Family
Migration
(2!3%)
1954 28,747 1,300 30,047 4
1957 18,133 3,700 21,833 17
1959 22,350 6,500 28,850 23
1961 6,455 5,300 11,755 45
Source: Adapted from Augarde, ok. cit.,
Table 2e
Evolution of Algerian
Population
Population Compared
of France 1954 and
(1) (2)
Pop. of Moslem Pop.
France of Algeria
(3)
Foreign
Pop. of
France
(4)
Algerian
Pop. of
France
Algerian
Mig. as
%/Pop.
France
(41l )%
Algerian
Mig. as
%/Foreig.
Fr. Pop.
(341 )%
Algerian
Mig. as
%/Al g.
Pop.
(412)%
1954 41,119,700 8,745,000 1,766,100 208,540 0.5% 11.8% 2.4%
1962 44,072,848 10,196,700 2,169,000 350,484 0.8% 16.1% 3.4%
Columns (1), (3),
oM. cit., p. 13.
(4), 1954, 1962 French Census; Column (2) Negadi et. al.,
p. 15.
to Total
1962
Foreign
Source:
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population. The two censuses of 1954 and 1962 show that the Algerian popula-
tion rose from 0.5 percent of the total French population to about 0.8 percent
in those eight years, while the active Algerian population as a percentage of
the active French population rose from 0.8 to 1.1 percent. As a proportion
of the Algerian population, the number of Algerians in France rose from 2.4
percent in 1954 to 3.4 percent in 1962. The proportion of the total active
population of Algeria in France also rose. One estimate20 suggests that the
number of Algerians in France in 1954 was 13-15 percent of the adult male
population of Algeria (20-59 years), and by 1962 this had risen to 18-19
percent. 21 Since census data considerably underestimate the true numbers of
foreigners in France, the proportions could have been higher than Table 2e
reveals. 22
On the eve of its independence, therefore, migration had become a massive,
structural, permanent feature of both the Algerian and French economies.
Family migration was becoming more and more important, while the areas from
which migrants came, although certain regions such as the Kabylia continued
to predominate, became more widespread. Emigration was ceasing to be just a
regional problem and becoming a national one.23 At the same time demographic
pressures inside Algeria were becoming severe while the creation of employ-
ment and new jobs tended to stagnate. The war of independence itself contri-
buted to this phenomenon, and on the whole tended to accelerate emigration.
France itself was becoming rather more dependent on labor supplies from
Algeria as against other countries, and Algerians were by far the biggest
group in terms of annual arrivals on the job market. Between 1946 and 1961
the number of ONI-introduced migrants exceeded the number of arrivals from
Algeria only three times, in 1947, 1957 and 1958. From 1947 to 1961 the
total number of entries from Algeria was 1,624,951, while the total number
introduced by the ONI was only 757,127.
-17-
While "dependence" for Algeria meant an overall dependence on France as
a provider of employment for nearly 20 percent of its active population,
"dependence" for France involved both the growing concentration of Algerians
in certain specific sectors of the economy and the increasingly preponderant
role of Algeria in new immigration.
-18-
3. Migration and International Negotiations'
3.1 Introduction
Between 1954 and 1962, the year of Algerian independence, the Algerian
population of France doubled, and it doubled again between 1962 and 1973
when Algeria and France were no longer colony and mother country. In 1964,
the semi-official Algerian newspaper El Moudjahid had written that "the
departure of our brothers (for France) remains a necessity and serves the
,24
reciprocal interests of our two countries. By 1973 the Algerian govern-
ment had suspended emigration altogether, with bitter accusations that the
French authorities were not making sufficient efforts to protect immigrant
workers against racist attacks.
What accounts for this reversal? Why did the emigration which in
1964 was claimed to be a necessary and reciprocal interest become by 1973 a
thorn in Franco-Algerian relations, bringing Algeria to the verge of severing
diplomatic relations with France? In this section we will trace the steps
leading to this remarkable change in policy. We will demonstrate the major
concerns of the two sides in their negotiations on the migrant question, and
show how they set about regulating and controlling the flow of migrant workers.
3.2 Algerian Emigration and the Evian Accords
The Accords of Evian, which set out in great detail the nature of
relations between France and the soon-to-be-independent Algeria, were finally
signed on March 18, 1962, following a year of negotiations between the GPRA
(Gouvernement Provisiore de la Republique Algerienne) and the French
-19-
government. Having decided to free Algeria, General de Gaulle was at pains
to ensure that relations with the ex-colony conformed as closely as possible
to his conception of French interests in the area. The Algerians were to be
offered, like other French colonies before them, a choice between close
association with France after independence or the bleaker alternative of a
more or less complete break in relations. The form of association envisaged
by the General granted French aid and technical assistance in return for the
safeguarding of French interests and for privileged status for French
industrial and commercial concerns. In recognizing Algerian sovereignty over
the Sahara, the Evian Accords guaranteed the French a privileged position
with respect to discovery, exploitation and marketing of Saharan oil.
As far as the European, especially French-speaking, community of Algeria
was concerned, the French position was to demand very specific guarantees
respecting their future. France wanted those Europeans who wished to continue
living in Algeria to have full citizenship rights while also maintaining
their French citizenship. The final compromise temporarily assured
Europeans their French nationality, and permitted them to return to France
if they so wished. At the end of three years they would be obliged to
choose between Algerian and French citizenship, but were in any case guaran-
teed certain rights, including freedom of religion, language and property.
This latter provision provided that no measure of dispossession would be taken
without fair compensation. 25
The question of migrant workers in France was, by all accounts, not
greatly disputed, nor was it a matter for prolonged debate and discussion.26
Negotiations mostly focused on the more thorny problems of the Sahara and
the fate of Algeria's Europeans.
-20-
General de Gaulle specifically referred to the question of migration
in one of his press conferences immediately before the opening of the first
Evian talks in April 1961. He said:
If the Algerian populations wish, definitively, to let
themselves be led to a rupture with France, in such a way
that we have no part to play in their fate, we would not
create any opposition to this. Naturally, we would forth-
with cease to sink our resources, our men, our money, into
an enterprise which would be from then on hopeless. We
would invite those of our nationals who find themselves
there, and who would really be running too many risks, to
leave the territories concerned. Conversely we would send
back home those Algerians living in France who would cease
to be French .2
De Gaulle was pointedly warning Algeria of the consequences of failing to
cooperate with France, and his threat to send migrant workers home was one
of the detrimental effects of a complete break. The General made it quite
plain that part of the economic quid pro guo of a policy of association would
be the continued access of Algeria to the French labor market.
There are in fact only two clauses in the Evian Accords which refer
directly to Algerian emigration in France. The first clause states:
Barring conviction for a criminal offense, every
Algerian supplied with an identity card is free to
circulate between Algeria and France.
And the second:
Algerian nationals resident in France and notably workers
will have the same rights as French nationals with the
exception of political rights. 28
The first clause, guaranteeing freedom of circulation, was designed not only
to permit the emigration of workers to France, but also to allow Europeans
who might eventually take Algerian citizenship to be free to come and go as
they wished. The next part of the text goes on to guarantee Algerians the
right to take out their goods, or sell their property and export the capital
-21-
sum realized. The freedom of circulation guaranteed in the Evian Accords
thus encompassed both an economic concession by the French to match Algerian
concessions (e.g., on oil and trade) and guarantees for the European population
felt necessary by the French negotiators.
The reference to the rights of workers in France was part of the section
of the Accords dealing with economic and financial cooperation, and in parti-
cular with exchanges between the two countries. These clauses establish
preferential trading arrangements between the two countries for example, and
provide for selling Algerian surplus production inside France. In this
context it seems strange to insert a clause about the rights of workers;
logically this would have fitted better in those parts of the Accords which
relate to the rights of Frenchmen in Algeria. Because of its place in the
context of commercial exchanges one may assume that the migration of workers
was not seen exclusively as a bargain allowing Algerians to come and go
freely between France and Algeria but was intended as a part of the overall
cooperation linking the two economic systems.
3.3 From Laissez-Faire to Lese-Humanite: The Nekkache-Grandval Accord, 1964
The fragility of the Evian Accords was demonstrated almost before
Algeria became formally independent. The OAS terror campaign in the summer
of 1962 provoked a mass outflow of the European population of Algeria, and
by October 1962 over 800,000 had fled the country. Almost immediately, there-
fore, the Evian arrangements lost much of their substance, many of the
guarantees accorded to the European population now having a very restricted
field of application. 29
In fact, the Evian Accords were from the first subject to a double
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pressure. On the one hand the European exodus from Algeria meant that the
Evian quid pro quo was no longer intact, while on the other hand French
officials felt that a renewed influx of Algerians seeking work in France
would strain the absorptive capacity of the French economy. The immigration
of the Europeans themselves contributed to the satiety of the labor market in
France.
The French government therefore requested negotiations to develop some
kind of control over the arrival of Algerians in France. But the desire to
control the emigration of Algerians was not unilaterally French. 30 The
Algerian authorities, in one of their early official acts, came out in
support of terminating the anarchic system which existed up to that point and
bringing the outflow under control. In November 1962, for example, the
Algerian government set up the Office National Algerien de Main d'Oeuvre
(ONAMO), one of whose tasks was to apply selective criteria to prospective
emigrants and check the outflow.31 There was, in sum, considerable agree-
ment between the French and Algerian governments on the need to modify the
freedom of workers to come and go as they pleased. In a press conference at
the end of his first visit to France the Algerian Minister of Labor, Bachit
Boumaza, was at pains to emphasize that it would be necessary to "rationalize"
and "filter" the emigration of Algerians so that it corresponded with the
employment situations of both France and Algeria.32
However, it was not until April 1964 that an agreement was finally
signed by Gilbert Grandval and the new Algerian Labor Minister, Mohammed
Nekkache. This last phase of the negotiations was undertaken with no parti-
cipation by the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,33 and the resultant
protocol granted the French almost everything they had been demanding while
giving very little to the Algerians.
Figure 3a: Entries and Exits of Permanent Workers and Families,
ONI and Algeria 1961-1974
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The main thrust of the protocol was that as of July 1, 1964, the arrival
of Algerians in France would be fixed according to the availability of labor
in Algeria and, since at this period the supply of Algerian labor was for
practical purposes infinitely elastic, according to the possibility of
employing it in France. In other words the French were given the right to
unilaterally determine how many Algerians they wished to see arrive on the
French labor market. It was agreed that the size of this "contingent" would
be examined and communicated to the Algerian authorities every quarter by
the French. In addition, medical controls were to be set up in Algeria by
a mission of French doctors placed directly at the disposal of the Algerian
government. The emigration of families was to be governed by the existence
of lodging for them. The only concessions to the Algerian position were a
promise by the French to facilitate the access of Algerian workers to centers
of professional training, and a further promise to negotiate a new accord on
professional training in the future. Finally, a mixed commission was to be
set up to examine difficulties that might arise from the application of the
protocol.
Why did the Algerians accept such a one-sided agreement, which seemed
to be scarcely in the Algerian interests and which very soon became itself
the cause of tension between the two countries? Part of the explanation is
to be found in the simple fact of Algerian weakness: as the stronger partner
France was in a position to exert various forms of pressure on Algeria. The
agreement clearly reflected this imbalance in the relationship between the
two countries.
By itself, however, this explanation is inadequate. Between 1962 and
1964 the French had carefully avoided acting unilaterally in the matter of
immigration apart from instituting medical controls in France. This shows
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that the French were not anxious to provoke a major dispute with Algeria by
an open breach of the Evian Accords. This simple fact ought to have given
Algeria some leverage in the negotiations. Some of the participants in the
negotiations are of the opinion that the agreement amounted to a simple
blunder by the Algerian side, partly the result of the personal inexperience
and incompetence of the Algerian Minister of Labor. It has been noted that
in the final phase of the talks there was no representation in the Algerian
delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would normally parti-
cipate and even direct negotiations of this kind. Whatever the explanation
for this lapse, it was the cause of some tension inside the Algerian govern-
ment, and led to immediate criticism of the agreement by Abdelaziz Bouteflika,
the Foreign Minister. 34
Finally, it should be pointed out once again that the Ben Bella govern-
ment was not averse to a reduction of the migrant flow; indeed some members
of the government wished to see emigration halted completely. The Algerians
were dismayed by the extent of the reduction of emigration as a result of the
Nekkache-Grandval agreement, but not the fact of a reduction by itself. It
was not until after the overthrow of Ben Bella that the Nekkache-Grandval
accord came under severe fire from the Algerians, the new administration
setting a higher priority for emigration in its development plans.
3.4 Fixed Quotas and Careful Handwriting: The Accord of 1968
The inadequacies of the 1964 Protocol became obvious almost immediately.
In the first place the annual contingent of Algerians was fixed by France at
about 12,000 per year, a level the Algerians considered insufficient and
intended to reduce French dependence on Algerian workers in favor of those
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from other countries. Perhaps even more disturbing from the Algerian point
of view was a series of restrictive measures taken by France in the autumn of
1964 to reduce the number of tourists coming from Algeria. The reason given
for this action by the French authorities was the apparent increase in "false
tourism," that is, Algerians who arrive as tourists but really came to look
for jobs. The limited number of ONAMO permits being given out in Algeria was
one main reason for this increase in clandestine job-hunting.
However by 1967 there was much basic agreement between the two sides.
Both wanted the 1964 agreement scrapped and saw its vagueness as a continuing
source of friction. Both also agreed that the ONAMO contingent should be
raised somewhat and that false tourism must be ended. The French, however,
argued that a better system of regulation based on some kind of residence
permit was necessary. This would make it easy to distinguish between Algerians
who had residence privileges in France associated with work permits and those
who could only stay temporarily, such as tourists. Such regulations already
applied to other nationalities.
The Algerian delegation rejected the notion that Algerians should be
treated like other nationalities; they insisted on the right of free circula-
tion and on the right of Algerians to change jobs and place of residence
inside France. Additionally, the Algerians wanted a larger contingent of
workers and one guaranteed for several years in advance. This was considered
necessary, first in order to permit advanced planning of the Algerian economy,
and second to remove any danger of the size of the contingent being used by
France as a means of exerting pressure on Algeria during other negotiations. 35
The Algerians were also extremely anxious for an accord couched in extremely
precise language, and not open to the kind of unilateral interpretation which
had marred application of the 1964 agreement.
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The actual size of the contingent was in fact less of a priority for
the Algerian side. At this time they naturally wanted the largest number
possible, but the final quota was agreed to by the common diplomatic process
of "splitting the difference": Algeria began by asking for a contingent of
about 45,000, and the initial French position was that 25,000 was about
right. In the Accord, which was finally signed on October 27, 1968, a
contingent of 35,000 workers was to be allowed to enter France each year for
a period of three years. After this period, a new contingent would be nego-
tiated. By an official exchange of letters between the two governments
France can request a re-examination of the size of the contingent in the event
of a grave economic crisis, but there is no provision for a unilateral
reduction by France.
In the Accord the 35,000 holders of an ONAMO card and a medical certi-
ficate from the French medical authorities are to be allowed to enter France
to look for work for a period of up to nine months. When they find a job
they are issued a residence certificate.
In total the 1968 Accord was a much more advantageous agreement from
the Algerian point of view than had been the 1964 agreement. The contingent
is quite large, and guaranteed for three years; the arrangements are detailed
and little room exists for unilateral interpretation; and those areas in
which discretionary powers are granted give a certain leverage to the Algerian
side (e.g., the issuance of passports to tourists), as well as to the French
(e.g., the expulsion of illegal job seekers).
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3.5 The Reduction of the Contingent: 1971 .
Between 1969 and 1970 few problems arose over the Accord. On the whole
the Algerian press praised the 1968 arrangements and the two years were
quite calm on the migration front. During 1971, several new elements
entered the situation. The end of 1971 was the last year of the 35,000
contingent agreed in 1968; thus new negotiations were needed to decide on a
new contingent. Second, the Algerian government was increasingly concerned
over what it considered to be insufficient control over its own oil resources,
and the continuing dominance of the French oil companies operating in
Algeria. On February 24, 1971, the Algerian government nationalized the
remaining French oil companies, provoking a severe crisis in Franco-Algerian
relations. At the same time the Algerian government and press launched a
massive campaign drawing attention to what it described as a "racist" press
campaign in France directed at immigrant workers, and a general increase in
racist attacks and acts of physical violence on Algerian workers themselves.
Still, the negotiations on migration which took place in December 1971
did not mark any great new departure. The French began by suggesting some
major changes in the 1968 arrangements. In particular the French delegation
wanted to bring the system for Algeria still closer to that used for other
countries and wanted to institute a work contract so that Algerians would
come to France only to do a specific job. The French offered to guarantee
Algeria a minimum of 15,000 contracts each year and fix no upper limit: if
French businessmen wanted to hire Algerians, they would be free to take as
many as they wanted above the minimum.36
From the Algerian perspective, the desire of the French to completely
revise the 1968 system was unwelcome. Their tactic in the negotiations which
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took place in the mixed commission was to deny -the competence of that body
to rewrite the 1968 Accord. The Algerians said they were prepared to discuss
the renegotiation of the 1968 agreements, but not before the question had been
properly studied by its government. In the meantime the duty of the mixed
commission was to fix a new contingent.
The new contingent was fixed at 25,000 for the following two years, that
is, 10,000 per year less than the previous contingent. The December 1971
talks led to the publication of a proces-verbal which made known the decision
to reduce the contingent and also noted the wish of the French delegation to
alter the existing arrangements. It provided for discussion to this end at
the close of 1973, and also noted the effort being made by France to improve
the housing and training facilities open to Algerian workers.
3.6 The Suspension of Emigration
It was during the summer of 1973, only a few months before it would
have been necessary to renegotiate the arrangements for the arrival of
Algerian workers, that a series of racial incidents in the south of France
radically changed the diplomatic picture.
In early August several hundred migrants held a demonstration outside
Grasse Town Hall and were illegally dispersed by riot police and fire-hoses.
On August 25 a mentally disturbed Algerian stabbed a Marseilles bus driver
to death, and this murder provoked several attacks on Arab workers in that
area.37 Between August 26 and 31 four Algerians were killed and two wounded
in Marseilles in apparent "revenge" attacks. 38 On September 3, 30,000 Arab
workers in Marseilles went on strike to protest against "racism," and they
were followed a day later by the majority of Toulon's 20,000 Arab workers. 39
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On September 19 the Algerian government decided to suspend all new
emigration forthwith. The decision did not affect workers already in France,
tourists, or other categories who remained free to come and go as they
pleased. And since the 1973 contingent of 25,000 had, by September, almost
been used up, the measure only directly affected about 4,000 workers who
should have been part of the remainder of the contingent.40
It became clear in subsequent months that the suspension was not in
fact temporary, even if that had been the original intention. At the time of
writing the Algerian position is that large-scale emigration to France will
never be resumed, but that some future agreement on sending workers for
professional training is not ruled out.41
On December 14 a bomb was set off at the Algerian Consulate in Marseilles
killing four people and wounding 16. The attack was immediately seized upon
by the Algerian government as yet another blow to relations between France
and the Arab world.42 Shortly afterward, Le Monde quoted an anonymous Algerian
official to the effect that "cooperation with France will henceforth be seen
from Algiers through the prism of immigration" since the migration question
was the last major issue between the two countries without a satisfactory
solution.
A year later, in December 1974, the French Minister of the Interior,
Michel Poniatowski, visited Algeria, accompanied by the Secretary of State
for Immigration, Paul Dijoud. The problem of migration was clearly at the
heart of the visit, and as a result the French government immediately took
several measures designed to improve conditions of Algerians in France.
The Poniatowski-Dijoud visit to Algiers was an essential preliminary
for a projected official visit to Algeria by President Giscard d'Estaing the
following spring, the first visit to Algeria by a French President since
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Algeria's independence, and both sides looked upon it as a symbolic step of
considerable importance. The visit would also have important political and
economic ramifications; Algeria was in the process of deciding how to spend
some 130 billion francs foreseen in its new four-year plan, a good part of
which would probably be awarded in the form of contracts to French firms. In
November 1974 the Algerian Minister of Industry, Belaid Abdesselem, visited
France with a delegation of directors from the state-owned companies, while
French industrialists visited Algeria on similar business. 44
On March 1, 1975 President Giscard d'Estaing paid a sudden visit to
Marseilles to "see for himself" the problem of immigration and poor housing.
This was openly done as a genuflection in the direction of Algeria, the
official presidential visit being only a few weeks away. The President said:
It was necessary before undertaking this journey to come to
Marseilles. It is a visit which had been planned since last
November .... It is important that it be known, before arriving
in Algeria, that the government is preoccupied with the fate of
migrant workers in Fran and particularly their living, housing
and working conditions.
The gesture was well-received in Algeria, and the presidential visit went
ahead.
As of the spring of 1975, migration remains in suspended animation. Over
800,000 Algerians continue to live and work in France, and they and their
friends and relatives continue to travel quite freely and in very large
numbers between the two countries. The ban on new worker emigration stays in
force, and is likely to remain.
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3.7 Trends and Patterns
The direction of Franco-Algerian negotiations on migration reveals the
emergence of three separate but related trends. First, we can see quite
clearly a change in the relative negotiating strength of the two sides. In
the early sixties Algeria seemed to be negotiating always from weakness,
while France retained most of the diplomatic initiative. Despite some
correspondence of interest between the two sides, it was France that was
able to request the alteration of the "free circulation" clauses of the
Evian Accords, and apply pressure on Algeria to comply with France's wishes.
And it was Algeria that was the immediate loser as a result of the 1964
agreement.
In subsequent years it seems that Algeria has been able to press its
point much more forcibly. In 1967 it obtained the doubling of the contingent
even though the Nekkache-Grandval Accord remained in force. In 1968 Algeria
obtained yet another increase in the size of its contingent, and this was
accompanied by the detailed guarantees it had sought, in place of the vague-
ness of the previous agreement. Even though Algeria had to agree to the
introduction of a residence permit for its citizens abroad, most of the
provisions of the 1968 Accord were considerably more advantageous for Algeria
than were similar agreements signed by France with other labor-supplying
countries.
By 1973 we can see that Algeria was taking almost all of the initiative
on the migration question. It was Algeria that decided to suspend its
emigration, and the President of France who offered penance in Marseilles
for the sins of his countrymen. The first evolution, therefore, is from
Algerian weakness to Algerian strength in the matter of migration.
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The second evolution that is noticeable is the evolution from free
circulation -- enshrined as a principle in the Evian Accords -- to more and
more restrictions and regulations being applied to Algerian workers. In
fact the movement away from free circulation is a movement in the direction
of the regulations applying to workers from the ONI countries such as Portugal,
Spain, Tunisia, Morocco, etc. In 1964 there were both severe quantitative
restrictions and medical controls. In 1968 the quantitative restrictions were
relaxed somewhat, but like ONI workers Algerians now had to have a residence
permit. In addition, tourists had to have passports instead of identity
cards, thus removing another carry-over from the colonial period. By 1971
the French were anxious to institute a system of contracts for Algerian
workers (like the ONI system) which would be administered by the ONI itself.
This initiative was rebuffed by Algeria in 1971, but France had put Algeria
on notice that the contract system and perhaps the introduction of work-
permits would be one of France's goals in the talks that were scheduled for
the end of 1973. The talks were pre-empted by Algeria's suspension of
emigration.
Third, it is noticeable that the number of workers to be allowed into
France each year has been less and less of a preoccupation for the negotiators.
Instead, qualitative considerations have come to predominate. In 1964 both
sides were anxious above all to limit the number of workers arriving in
France each year. France was also worried by the medical aspects of the
problem, and although Algeria sought assurances on training for its workers
the 1964 agreement is extremely vague on this point. By 1968 the size of the
contingent had become of great importance for both sides, but relatively
little time was spent by the negotiating teams on this point. Algeria was
more concerned that the contingent be fixed for several years in advance,
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whatever its ultimate size, while France was anxious to secure Algerian
agreement on the question of residence permits. The 1968 agreement was also
rather more specific than the earlier one on the question of professional
training, even though it did not go far enough from the Algerian perspective.
By 1973 we can see that qualitative considerations completely over-
shadow quantitative ones. The point signaled by the Algerian boycott of
emigration was that the number of workers arriving in France annually was
immaterial, but that the improvement of the living and working conditions of
Algerians already abroad was not. A policy of encouraging workers to return
to Algeria was instituted at this time, having as its object the return of
skilled workers, of whom Algeria was short.
These evolutionary patterns call for some explanation. Why was Algeria
relatively more powerful in 1974 than in 1962? Why do the French authorities
wish to treat Algerian workers differently nowadays when in 1962 they were
happy to allow free circulation and in 1968 were content with a contingent?
In what ways have the circumstances of the two sides changed so that they are
increasingly concerned with qualitative considerations and decreasingly
preoccupied with head-counting?
Secondly, are these three trends related to one another? Are they
separate but simultaneous changes, or are they part of a single causal chain?
In the next section we will attempt to answer these questions.
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4. Migration and Manipulation: Trade, Oil and People
4.1 Introduction
What is the relationship between the politics of migration and the
politics of international relations? In what way does the transfer of humans
across frontiers fit into the pattern of contacts which countries establish
between themselves? In the 19th century it was often said that trade follows
the flag, meaning that in the rear guard of the armies which established
European colonies in Asia and Africa came businessmen intent upon the search
for profit. Marxists have disputed this point and asserted the opposite:
that the flag follows trade and the search for overseas profits was the main
cause of colonialism.
Both arguments have merit. Certain trading patterns were established
both because a colony was the private preserve of the power which colonized
it and because imperial expansion itself was not wholly unrelated to commer-
cial principles.
But if trade and politics were linked to one another, how did migration
fit? In the colonial period trade followed the flag and, in the case of
Algeria, migration followed trade. Algerians went to France in search of
work because Algeria was a French colony and because of the extensive economic
contact that existed.
What happened to this relationship when Algeria ceased to be a colony?
What happened when the flag retreated to France, and trade between the two
countries ceased to be based upon French prerogatives but upon two-party
negotiation?
The central discussion in this chapter will revolve around these
relationships. It will be shown that the politics of international migration
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are very much tied to the politics of international economics in general and
that it is not possible to understand the situation of Algerian workers in
France in 1974 without first grasping the way Franco-Algerian economic
relations have evolved since 1962.
4.2 Franco-Algerian Relations
It would not be inaccurate to describe the ten years following Algeria's
formal accession to independence as being the history of Algeria's struggle
to consummate its formal independence by extricating itself from the economic
dependence which existed at the beginning of the period.
Franco-Algerian "cooperation" during this period revolved around
several competing themes which recurred to heat relationships periodically.
The main issues involved at the beginning tended to be those most immediately
connected with the colonial heritage -- the fate of the property belonging
to the colons who had fled Algeria during 1962, the use by France of
military bases in Algeria itself, and short-term financial assistance to the
almost bankrupt Algerian administration. The emphasis quite rapidly passed
from these teething troubles to matters which resulted from the colonial
experience but whose importance transcended colonialism and whose long-term
significance for the two countries was far greater. Essentially these matters
involved the control and development of Algeria's oil industry, the question
of Algeria's wine harvest, and lastly, of course, the problem of migrant
labor.
The negotiations between the two governments over these questions
produced a continuous dialogue between France and Algeria that was sometimes
friendly, sometimes acrimonious, and always intense. The wide range of
relationships involved, the intrinsic importance to both sides of the questions
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under discussion, and the virtually continuous nature of the debate, meant
that issues and problems were inextricably linked to each other in the minds,
attitudes and proposals of the negotiators. Formally, a series of negotiations
leading to an agreement on, say, the import of Algerian wine into France, was
separate from a parallel series of talks designed to regulate the posted
price per barrel of Algerian oil. The timing and rhythm, the location and
priorities of the two sets of talks would be different. Most of the men
doing the negotiating would in all probability be different too, and would
represent different government ministries. In practice, however, there was
considerable overlap of personnel since the Foreign Ministries of both sides
(before 1965 the French Secretariat d'Etat for Algerian Affairs) normally had
the responsibility of organizing, conducting and coordinating all negotiations.
Despite the formal separation it was inevitable that there be some degree of
coincidence between issues and areas of concern. Even when for tactical
reasons one side or the other would refuse to compromise or accept pressures
outside the boundaries of subject-matter, the whole context and mood of the
discussion would be unavoidably linked to the general status of Franco-
Algerian relations.
The perspectives of the two sides were obviously different. From the
French point of view two considerations were paramount from the start. First,
the French considered it of the highest importance that they maintain a near
monopoly in the exploration, production and marketing of Algerian oil. The
growth in the importance of Saharan oil had been recent and dramatic. In
1959 of total French crude oil imports of 29 million tons, less than one
million tons came from Algeria, but by 1963 over 35 percent of French petrol
imports came from Algeria.46 Algerian oil was important to France in the
overall development of the Gaullist strategy of political, economic and
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diplomatic independence from the United States: the development of a French
oil industry based upon Algerian oil reduced French dependence on American
companies operating in the Middle East. The availability of Algerian oil
would result in diversification of French supplies -- a consideration which
in the'1950's seemed paramount after the unsuccessful Suez campaign. It
would give France the opportunity to develop its own oil industry, and hence
compete with the United States and Britain; and it would permit France to pay
for its oil in francs, thus saving valuable foreign exchange and alleviating
balance of payments problems. 47
The other major consideration for France, and in the long run perhaps
of even greater significance than oil, was the overriding importance of
retaining good relations with Algeria for relations with the rest of the
Third World. Algeria was the most populous and resource-rich country in
North Africa and had the potential to become one of the most powerful and
influential countries in the Third World. Since the end of the War of Inde-
pendence, de Gaulle had wanted "exemplary relations" with Algeria. As well
as French economic interests in Algeria, de Gaulle seemed to want to demon-
strate the impact of French culture and civilization upon a now independent
country, and hold up Franco-Algerian relations as a model of cooperation
between developed and developing societies. Many commentators have noted
how much more willing de Gaulle was to forgive independent Algeria its sins
against French interests than he was other countries like Tunisia or Morocco.48
For France, Algeria was the "narrow door through which we must pass to reach
the Third World" in Secretary of State for Algerian Affairs Jean de Broglie's
phrase. He went on to say:
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A quarrel between France and some other state of North Africa
is nothing more than bilateral tension. A quarrel with
Algeria would transcend the limits of Franco-Algerian relations
and might wreck our diplomatic goals throughout the entire
world.49
Having incurred considerable censure by much of the developing world for its
conduct during the war with Algeria, France's post-independence policy was
to rebuild its bridges with the Third World via Algeria.
The Algerians wanted to take advantage of France's willingness to extend
the hand of cooperation, but were determined at the same time to limit any
reductions in their freedom of choice that such cooperation might entail. The
Tripoli Program50 proclaimed that the economic policy of Algeria was to be
"against foreign domination" and "to break the grip of the monopolies by
reorganising our economic ties abroad, first of all with France." The Program
went on to call for "the gradual elimination . . . of the preferential system
between France and Algeria" as well as the nationalization of "the essential
instruments of foreign trade." The Program required strict control by the
state of the development of the petroleum and other heavy industries, and
the equally important regulation of exports and profit reinvestment by
foreign companies. The Tripoli Program did, however, stop short of demanding
the nationalization of most foreign industrial concerns, although calling for
the nationalization of foreign financial institutions. 5 1
4.3 The Decline in Economic Contact
The Tripoli Program expressed very clearly Algeria's intention to
diversify its economic concerns abroad and reduce its economic dependence
upon France. This policy was reiterated in 1964 by Bachir Boumaza, then
Minister of Industry and Energy, when he said, "We wish to break our relations
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of dependence with France by a greater and greater commercial opening on the
world, and by a diversification of exchanges." 52
In the years immediately following independence, this policy met with
only limited success. The aftermath of the War of Independence, and the chaos
which resulted from the OAS terror campaign and the exodus of the European
population, if anything resulted in even greater reliance on France. To save
the Algerian Treasury from bankruptcy the French government contributed
about one billion old francs (about 2 million dollars) per day until the end
of the first year of independence. In addition, France embarked upon a
massive program of economic and technical assistance, including the temporary
staffing of much of Algerian business and government machinery with French
nationals.53 In 1962, 77 percent of Algeria's exports went to France, and a
similar proportion of her imports came from there. 54  In 1963, 239 million
dollars in aid were received from France, a sum which represented 85 percent
of the total aid Algeria received that year and 34 percent of total French
aid given anywhere.55
Figures 4a and 4b show the evolution of some key indicators of Franco-
Algerian economic contacts. Figure 4a demonstrates that although the propor-
tion of trade between the two countries declines between 1962 and 1973, the
decline between 1962 and 1965 is quite slow. Figure 4b shows that the
decline in aid received by Algeria is only noticeable towards the end of the
sixties, not the beginning (although the decline of Algeria in total French
aid to the world is more marked).
In fact, the years 1964 and 1965 saw Algeria and France locked into
three sets of diplomatic talks concerning matters of the utmost importance
to the Algerian economy -- wine, oil and emigration.
Algeria's wine was its most important agricultural product. The wine
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was introduced on a large scale by the colons into a country whose religion
forbids it to consume alcohol. As a result the bulk of the wine crop was
exported to France, without whose purchases Algerian agriculture would be in
serious difficulties. Before independence France had imported 15 million
hectolitres (about 330 million gallons) of Algerian wine per year. In 1963
imports had fallen to less than 7 million hectolitres. On January 18, 1964,
an accord was signed by the two countries which guaranteed the import by
France of certain minimum quantities of wine per year until 1968.56 Through
this accord the Algerian government succeeded in winning a breathing-space
for its on the whole unwanted wine industry for the next several years,
against the very powerful French wine lobby which wanted to restrict the
import of Algerian wine to negligible quantities.
The other major set of negotiations during 1964 concerned the revision
of parts of the Evian Accords relating to the running of the Algerian oil
industry. The Evian Accords had granted those French companies working
Saharan oil the right to continue under about the same terms as before
independence. At the same time French companies were given assurances that
in future research and exploitation their bids would be given priority over
those of other foreign countries in the case of equality of tender-price. In
addition a joint Franco-Algerian organization was set up to maintain the road
and communication infrastructure in the Sahara and also to oversee application
of the mining laws and concession permits.
Despite rapid expansion of oil production during the years 1961, 1962
and 1963, the Algerians became increasingly dissatisfied with the state of
affairs. They were concerned over the lack of trained Algerian personnel in
the oil industry, the apparent reluctance of the oil companies to press ahead
with new explorations due to the then unstable political climate in Algeria
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and with the affront to their sovereignty of this carry-over from the colonial
period. A major dispute arose concerning the construction of a third Saharan
oil pipeline. The Evian agreement had given the discoverers of the oil the
right to transport it to the coast. The Algerian government wanted a share
in the construction and operation of the proposed pipeline and after much
haggling eventually decided to form a new company of its own, which subsequently
paid a British firm to build the pipeline. Full control was retained by
Al geria. 57
An Accord on the petrol question was finally signed after twenty months
of negotiations, the signing taking place only a month after the coup d'etat
which overthrew Ahmed Ben Bella and installed Houari Boumedienne at the head
of the Algerian government. Considered revolutionary at the time, the agree-
ment created a French/Algerian state oil company with the countries as equal
partners in the exploitation of designated oil fields. This brought Algeria
into the picture at every stage of the oil cycle, research, drilling, trans-
portation and marketing. Royalties were increased and a posted price was set
that was at the time rather higher than the world price, even taking into
account reduced transport costs from Algeria to France. In addition France
was to give Algeria 200 million francs in annual aid for the next five years
(160 million francs in 20 year loans at 3 percent interest, and 40 millions
of gifts). To this was added an additional 200 millions of francs in ordinary
commercial credits guaranteed by the Compagnie Frang'aise d'Assurance pour
le Commerce Exterieur (C0FACE).58
Algeria thus signed agreements with France during 1964 and 1965 on all
three of the vital issues which confronted it. The oil agreement was by far
the most advantageous and at the time gave Algeria far more input into the
running of its oil industry than any other Arab country had. The wine
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agreement too appeared of great benefit to Algeria, even though it soon became
meaningless owing to pressures on the French government by French wine-
growers to halt the import of Algerian wine.
Only the agreement on emigration, the Nekkache-Grandval Accord, was
clearly disadvantageous for Algeria. We have explained this as being partly
the result of Algerian weakness, and partly the result of political ineptness.
We might also add at this point the view that the migration question was not
as central to Franco-Algerian relations as either oil or wine. It was not
regarded with the same kind of urgency as the gaining of some control over
the oil industry as the foundation-stone of a more ambitious industrialization
program.
By the late sixties and early seventies, however, a clear decline took
place in economic contacts between the two countries, as Figures 4a and 4b
show. The percentage of Algerian exports to France declined from nearly 80
percent of Algeria's total exports in 1962 to just over 20 percent by 1973.
During this period the proportion of total French imports coming from Algeria
fell from nearly 10 percent to just over 1 percent. If we look at aid we
see a similar trend, but with rather more fluctuation. Algeria received 40
percent of total French economic aid in 1962; by 1973 the figure had declined
to 2.5 percent. For Algeria this represented a shift from 90 percent to 16
percent of foreign aid coming from France.
It is rather more difficult to get data on the amount of private French
investment in Algeria, which would of course measure an important aspect of
the economic relationship between the two countries. The official French
insurance agency for overseas investment, COFACE, provides some insight here.
In 1969 of total guarantees valued at 14,602 million francs, 1,472 million or
about 10 percent were for Algeria. In 1971, guarantees stood at 18,706 million
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francs, of which Algeria accounted for 885 million, or less than 5 percent.
The promises of guarantees for Algeria registered in each year fell from
3,770 million francs in 1969 to 1,128 million francs in 1972.59 In 1973
itself, French net private long-term capital invested in Algeria was valued
at 280 million francs while in the same year Japan invested over 540 million
francs, and the total foreign direct investment was about 760 million francs. 60
It is therefore fairly clear that Algeria has succeeded in distancing
itself to a considerable extent from France in its economic contacts. The
slack has been taken up by other western market-economy countries, especially
Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.A., and to a much lesser extent
some communist countries. It should be added, however, that France still
remains Algeria's leading trading partner and that the Algerian government
now seems to be satisfied that the level of interactions ought to be maintained
at their new lower level. Figure 4a indicates that the proportion of mutual
trade has remained very stable since 1971.
What has been the consequence of this evolution for the migration
question? The quantity of emigration from Algeria to France has remained
relatively stable compared to the changes in trade and aid flows. In the
early sixties, therefore, when Algeria and France appeared to move closer
together rather than further apart, the importance of migration in the overall
relationship tended to decline. Since roughly 1966-1967, when the decline in
economic contacts became marked while migration remained stable, the opposite
has been true. In other words, migration was less important in Franco-Algerian
relations in the early sixties, but more important since then.
This is shown very clearly in Figure 4c, where we have constructed an
"index of importance" of migration in relations between the two countries.
The index was constructed by adding four sets of percentages showing trade,
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petrol, aid and migration flows between the two- countries as a fraction of
Algerian flows to all countries, and comparing migration to this total percen-
tage. When the index is transformed into a three year moving average, it
shows a relatively flat or downward-drifting pattern between 1963 and 1968,
and then a marked upward trend. By 1972, migration was far more "important"
in Franco-Algerian relations than at any previous time.
4.4 Nationalization and Emigration
By 1967-1968 the question of Algerian emigration had become inextri-
cably tangled with other aspects of Franco-Algerian cooperation. By this
time the control and organization of the oil industry were once again
emerging as a problem despite the 1965 agreement, but a serious crisis in
relations over this question did not occur until a few years later. The
principal disputes in 1967-1968 focused on the wine problem once again and on
the continued series of nationalizations of French companies operating in
Algeria.
As far as wine was concerned, the French had renounced the 1964 agree-
ment under intense pressure from French wine-growers, and on February 13, 1967,
the importation of Algerian wine was halted altogether for a while. For the
year, of the 7.26 million hectolitres of imports foreseen by the 1964 agree-
ment only 3.1 million hectolitres were imported.61
In 1968 the situation for the two sides became more complex. In March
the Algerian Minister of the Interior, Ahmed Medeghri, visited Paris in order
to discuss outstanding problems, including migration. As a result of this
visit the French agreed to remove the limit they had set earlier that permitted
only 250 tourists per week to enter France.62 In return Medeghri is reported
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to have assured the French that no further nationalizations of French owned
industries would take place.63 In view of the economic recession in France,
the Algerians were prepared to postpone for a time the question of final
agreement on a migration accord. An analysis of Medeghri's visit published
in the Algerian daily paper El Moudjahid reasoned that a delay of several
months, until the economic situation in France generated a call for more
foreign manpower, might be better for Algeria in any agreement with the French
government.64
Shortly after the Medeghri visit however, the Minister of Industry,
Belaid Abdesselam, apparently convinced President Boumedienne that continued
takeovers of French companies were necessary for attaining greater economic
independence.65 As a result, on May 13 the government took over all companies
selling oil and gas products, and a week later it took control of twenty-
seven French firms manufacturing fertilizers, construction materials,
machinery, electrical supplies, textiles, and food. Other nationalizations,
mainly of French companies, followed during the spring and summer.66
The timing of these measures seemed to indicate they were calculated
to take advantage of French disarray during the student unrest in May 1968;
certainly many observers at the time interpreted the Algerian action in this
light. 67 On June 18 the French government announced that as of July 1 the
Algerian contingent would be limited to only 1,000 per month, although it had
been running at about 3,000 per month in the first half of the year.68 This
was interpreted in Algeria as direct retaliation for the nationalizations.
President Boumedienne in a June 20 speech said:
She (France) fully has the right to refuse Algerian workers, just
as Algeria has the right to nationalize industrial enterprises
if she wishes. 69
-49-
The following month, as its economic situation continued to deteriorate, the
French government took measures to reduce the intake of other foreign workers,
especially those introduced by the ONI. 70 Thus even if the reduction of the
French contingent was an act of retaliation Algeria suffered from it only
for a month more than did other migrant-exporting countries.
The Algerian government also retaliated over the wine and migration
limits by halting import into Algeria of certain French textile and metal
products, and introducing new import duties which further reduced commercial
exchanges between the two countries.71
The overall deterioration in Franco-Algerian relations during 1968 was
one of the principal factors which delayed the signing of a migration accord
until the end of the year. It seems clear that the resultant agreement
stemmed in part from a reorientation in Algerian priorities as compared with
1964. Wine was by now rather less of a preoccupation for the Algerian
government than the continuation of its domestic industrialization program.
Reforms in agriculture were ignored and emigration came to be regarded more
than ever as a "safety-valve" for unemployment problems in the agricultural
sector. Since agricultural revenues depended in large part on the export
of wine to France, and since France was unwilling to buy Algerian wine, France
could help maintain rural living standards in Algeria by accepting immigrant
workers. Given the intensity of the pressure from French wine-growers the
French government found it easier to make concessions over the contingent for
Algerian workers than over Algerian wine. From the Algerian perspective it
was cheaper to allow surplus agricultural labor to depart than it was to set
about a major reform of agriculture.
By 1971 a further shift can be seen in the relative degree of importance
Algeria attached to the migration question. In February Algeria finally took
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over complete control of the oil industry, assuming a 51 percent interest in
French oil companies and taking over all natural gas concessions. The oil
industry was intended to be the nulceus of a large petro-chemical industry,
providing a base for the rest of Algeria's industrialization and moderni-
zation effort. According to the Minister of Industry, Abdesselam, Algeria
wanted to "sow petrol in order to harvest industry."72
The effect of this nationalization on the migration question was
profound. The nationalizations provoked an immediate crisis in Franco-
Algerian relations. France regarded the procedure as a violation of the 1965
agreement and was faced with the necessity of an entire reorientation of its
energy policy as a result. Some observers remarked that by April 1971
Algerian-French relations were at their lowest ebb since independence. 73
After 1971 France began to turn more and more to Saudi Arabia for its oil, 74
and the economic separation of France and Algeria accelerated.
The dispute provoked in the Algerian government an enormous concern
over the living conditions of its migrant workers in France, and convinced
the authorities that the attacks and other acts of discrimination breaking
out against Algerian workers were directly related to the crisis of relations.
Some Algerians at least, and some other observers, thought that the reduction
of the Algerian migrant contingent in 1971 was a direct act of retaliation
by the French for the nationalizations. Additional evidence often cited for
this interpretation was that in July 1971 the French had signed an agreement
with Portugal granting that country a contingent of 65,000 migrant workers, 75
but in fact the contingent for Portugal represented a decrease from previous
years. The numbers in 1969 and 1970 had been 80,829 and 88,634 respectively. 76
The protocol was signed with the aim of reducing this number to a maximum of
65,000 per year, and, indeed, in the subsequent two years the number of
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Portuguese entries was drastically reduced.
The French reduction of the Algerian contingent in fact coincided with
economic difficulties at home and with measures to reduce immigration from
all sources. Le Monde reported in January 1972 both that unemployment had
increased by 39 percent in the previous 14 months, and that in the first 10
months of 1971 ONI immigration had fallen by 15 percent.77 In February 1972
the French Minister of Labor, Fontanet, sent out his famous Circular which
was also designed to drastically curtail immigration.
Finally, the Algerian participants in the 1971 negotiations did not
themselves believe that the reduction was an act of retaliation.78 They
seemed to accept the argument that it was due to difficult economic conditions
in France.
Most important of all, the economic and psychological implications for
Algeria of its final economic emancipation radically altered its conception
of the migration problem. After 1971 Algeria was at last in firm control
of all major sectors of its economy and far less dependent on France than
formerly. Revenues accruing to the state from the oil industry increased
considerably as a result of cutting out the French companies, making Algeria
less dependent on the transfer of savings by Algerian workers abroad. In an
interview one Algerian official noted that after 1971 the priority became
the "defense" of the migrants, while the problem of the size of the migratory
flow became "secondary."
The increase in oil revenues also made possible a rapid advance in
Algeria's already ambitious industrialization policy. But one of the main
obstacles to this policy was the shortage of skilled workers in Algeria, and
the need to hire persons at great cost from foreign countries. Algerian
officials began to think seriously about the availability in France of a pool
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of skilled labor that might be attracted home. The 1971 "Rapport sur
l'Emigration" makes the point that the return of skilled workers in the
emigrant community was henceforth to be a major principle of Algerian policy.
Thus, despite the continuation of chronic unemployment in Algeria
qualitative considerations began to predominate over quantitative ones in its
decisions concerning emigration.
During 1973 the migration issue began to gather steam once again, for
at the year's end the 1971 agreement would expire. France had already put
Algeria on notice that any new agreement could not simply be an extension of
the 1968 Accord. Not only was the question of the contingent up for debate,
but the whole structure of the migration system was to be changed.
Up until 1971 the prevailing Algerian attitude had been that migration
was a short-to-medium term necessity for the country. Although the Algerians
had made efforts to secure improvements in housing conditions and professional
training for their emigrants, the major focus of policy had been on quantity --
how many emigrants could be siphoned off each year to France? French deter-
mination to bring the statute for Algerians more into line with that for other
labor supplying countries, as well as the implications for Algeria of its
take-over of the oil industry, led to a different attitude.
The easing of pressure on the Algerian labor market was considered,
rightly or wrongly, to be less important in 1973 than it had been in 1968 or
1971. The Algerian government was prepared to barter its quantitative impact
on French immigration in return for qualitative improvements in the treatment
of its workers. By this was meant two things. The Algerians insisted that
the migrants' living and working conditions be drastically improved and that
French authorities take decisive action to deter racist incidents. Additionally,
the Algerians now felt that their most important short-term priority was the
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building up of skilled, highly-trained cadres who would be able to return to
Algeria and fill the nation's serious gaps in qualified manpower. The
importance of the "reinsertion" of migrants was increasingly stressed. The
Algerian government thought that concessions could be made to France on
quantitative and legal issues, in return for concrete proposals for professional
training and meeting social problems. 79 Although in public the Algerian
government continued to complain that Algerians were being discriminated
against in favor of Portuguese, 80 by 1973 "qualitative" thinking was firmly
instilled in the Algerian government's conception of migration problems.
At first glance the Algerian decision to suspend emigration in the face
of the violence against its workers in France is a puzzling one. Racism
directed against them has been a constant factor in the lives of Algerian
workers, and there is some question why the violence of August 1973 should have
been a watershed for Algeria's policy. Why did the Algerian government
perceive racism as a determining factor in its relations with France in 1973,
when it had not in earlier years?
To some extent we have explained this already: migration now represented
a much larger proportion of total Franco-Algerian interaction than had once
been the case. It remained the last important link with the colonial past,
and the last tangible reminder of Algeria's former status. This perception
was heightened by the fact that the summit conference of non-aligned nations
was due to take place in Algiers on September 5, 1973. Its apparent depen-
dence on France in labor matters was probably a source of embarrassment for
the Algerian government at a time when the leaders of the Third World were
gathered in Algiers to plan a "new international economic order." The
Algerian government's self-image as a leader of the non-aligned world, 81 a
role it intended to play at the conference and some months later at the
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extraordinary session of the U.N. General Assembly, was compromised by its
inability to protect its workers abroad from racist attacks.
Some attempt was made to use the non-aligned conference to shame France
and deflect attention away from Algeria. El Moudjahid printed an article
which Le Monde thought was "obviously inspired by a high official" and which
asked rhetorically, "What is the image that France wishes to have in the
Third World? Will it be that of a country like the United States, devoured
by racism?"82
On the whole, however, only a dramatic gesture, such as the immediate
suspension of emigration, could bring luster to its anti-imperialist armor
and prove that Algeria was not the catspaw of world capitalism.
It was therefore international rather than domestic reasoning that led
to the suspension. Emigration had declined to a considerable extent as a
matter of domestic concern, and as migration became less important for
Algeria's economy it became more important for Algeria's prestige. It was
noticeable during the crisis of the summer of 1973 that for the first time
Algeria's overall policy of "cooperation" with France could be called into
question over the migration issue. Indeed one Algerian official was convinced
that Algeria would break off diplomatic relations with France if the incidents
against Arab workers were not rapidly brought under control. 83
4.5 Migration and International Relations
During the colonial period trade followed the flag (and vice versa)
and migration followed trade. In the years since 1962, what has happened to
this pattern? Is it possible to establish the existence of a relationship
between migration flows and Franco-Algerian economic contacts in general?
-55-
It is clear that there is no particular relationship between the
quantity of migration and the quantity of trade and other flows between the
two countries. The numbers of Algerians entering France fluctuate greatly
from year to year both absolutely and proportionately, while at the same time
the trend of other economic contacts has been fairly consistently downward.
On the other hand, we have shown the existence of forces which tended
to make the migration issue acquire increasing significance in the structure
of Franco-Algerian relations. We have noted that the growing importance of
migration as an international political issue was a critical element in the
Algerian decision to halt emigration in the Autumn of 1973.
Figure 4c, which presents the upward trend of the index of importance,
also contains fluctuations which are of some interest. The years when major
decisions or negotiations concerning migration were undertaken by the two
countries were years in which the index hit a peak. The index is high for
1963 and 1964, the years of the first French opposition to the free circulation
clauses of the Evian Accords and subsequently of the Nekkache-Grandval Accord.
1965 was a trough year, while in 1966 another peak brought more unilateral
French restrictions on immigration and a resumption in January 1967 of nego-
tiations between the two governments. 1968 was another peak in the index, and
was the year in which the important accord was signed fixing the 35,000
contingent and introducing residence certificates for Algerians. The index
again peaks in 1971 with the revision of the 1968 Accord, and in 1973 when
the Algerian initiative was taken to stop its emigration altogether.
It would therefore appear that regulations governing the flow of migrants
are associated with years in which migration assumes particular significance
in terms of overall economic relations between the two countries. In years
in which migration peaks in terms of "importance" new sets of rules and regu-
lations designed to govern the migration flow tend to be introduced. These
Figure 4c: Index of "Importance" of Migration as an International Issue
between France and Algeria, 1962-1973
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may be restrictive, as in 1964, 1971 and 1973. But this is not always the
case, since in 1967 and 1968 the Algerian contingent was actually increased.
What, therefore, is the relationship between economic contacts and
migration? The decline in economic relations has been matched by a trend in
the type of rules applying to Algerian workers in France. It was observed
earlier that the legal situation pertaining to Algerian migrants shifted
from the free circulation provisions of the Evian Accords to an approximation
of the restrictions applying to immigrants from other countries. There has
obviously been a parallel evolution; as France and Algeria's special economic
relationship has disintegrated, so Algerian workers have been treated
progressively less as a special case and more like everyone else. As Franco-
Algerian relations became less and less "privileged," so did Algerian workers
in France.
This analysis has broader applications than just Franco-Algerian
relations. The Francophone countries which established a close economic
community with France in 1958 were also granted freedom of circulation for
workers. But by 1974, when the economic ties between these ex-colonies and
France were much weaker than in 1958, France was seeking arrangements with
them to abrogate their "free circulation" rights, just as it had done with
Algeria. Meanwhile, the European Economic Community, with whom France has
close economic contacts on the level of trade and commerce, still maintains
almost complete freedom of movement for workers. The ONI countries, whose
economic contacts with France are less than those of the E.E.C., Francophone
Africa, or Algeria, experience the most extensive regulation of their workers.
These correlations are summarized in Figure 4d.
In the case of Algeria we have seen how the Algerian government made a
very conscious decision to reduce its economic contacts with France. It
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Figure 4d: Relationship Between the Regulation of Immigration
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diversified its trade, nationalized French industry, and encouraged other
countries to participate in important development projects. As a consequence,
the extent of economic ties between the countries diminished. For this
reason, France began to move away from the special rules once applicable to
Algerian immigrants. A similar evolution is noticeable in France's relations
with Francophone Africa. The decline in trade and other contacts with former
colonies was partly a conscious decision of both sides, but there was also in
the 1960's a secular trend for industrialized countries to trade increasingly
with each other and decreasingly with the traditional protected markets of
the colonies.
Among the consequences for France of this shift in external economic
relations has been agreement to permit easier freedom of movement of persons
from close economic partners, and restrictiveness toward nationals of other
countries. The causal sequence would seem to be that political decisions
lead to increased or decreased economic contact between countries, which in
turn leads to different kinds of regulations on the migration of workers.
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5. Conclusion
The politics of Franco-Algerian relations and the politics of migration
between the two countries are related in three main ways.
First, the decline in economic contacts between France and Algeria was
the result of a deliberate Algerian policy to diversify its foreign economic
contacts. However, migration tended to continue on average at fairly high
levels, and as a result its relative importance in the overall structure of
relations tended to increase.
Second, the nationalization of French industries in Algeria, especially
the oil industry, was part of a policy by the Algerian government of reducing
French influence in Algeria. The consequences of this policy for migration
were (i) to make Algeria less reliant on emigration as a solution for its
domestic economic problems; (ii) to accelerate the decline in economic contacts
between the two countries, with migration perceived as important in interna-
tional terms; and (iii) to make Algerian officials more conscious of an acute
shortage of skilled labor which might be filled by the return to Algeria of her
skilled migrants.
Third, the erosion of the privileged status of Algerians in France was
closely matched by the general reduction in Franco-Algerian relations since
independence. The French were less willing to treat Algerians as a special
case when France's "special relationship" with Algeria had suffered so
precipitous a decline.
Many studies of the causes and effects of international migration fail
to place enough stress on the political variables that have been seen to be
important here. Our analysis shows very clearly that there are in fact close
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links between the politics of migration and other aspects of the ties between
the two countries. It is impossible to understand the structure, pattern and
flow of Algerian migration to France without first understanding the broader
context. First, one of the main "causes" of migration, or of a particular
migratory pattern, is the series of general commercial and political relation-
ships between countries. If we wish to know why there were a certain number
of Algerian immigrants to France in a given year, it is not enough to refer
simply to the relative demand and supply in the respective labor markets. A
critical variable here is the decisions taken by the two governments about
how the migratory flow should be controlled. These decisions are mainly
governed by the state of relations between the governments.
Second, the migratory flow itself effects the relations between govern-
ments, and is itself a factor which influences foreign policy. In the case
of Franco-Algerian relations, the migration question has become increasingly
important and reached the point in September 1973 that Algeria found itself
on the verge of severing diplomatic relations over the problem.
The migration-relationship is a sensitive one and has often been the
cause of considerable friction between France and Algeria. Both sides have
attempted at various times to use migration as a means of exerting pressure
on the other although with limited success. In the years immediately
following Algeria's independence France seemed to be in a position to use
this leverage all the more easily, but in subsequent years the edge of the
sword has turned in Algeria's favor.
In general, however, both France and Algeria have been anxious to deal
with migration questions in close contact with one another. Unilateral
actions occurred from time to time (France 1964; Algeria 1973) but usually with
the object of persuading the other side to cooperate more fully.
S
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